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Alan Schwartz* 
1. Introduction 
Two purposes animate the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that the 
bankruptcy court value consumer property that is subject to a security 
interest or mortgage. First, §506(a)(l) provides: An "allowed claim 
secured by a lien on property ... is a secured claim to the extent of the. 
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property 
. . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim." \\ 
Creditors vote in bankruptcy proceedings with dollars, but only unse-
cured dollar claims count as votes. Thus the bankruptcy court, at the 
outset of a _case, must value the property that the creditor claims is 
subject to its lien in order to see how many unsecured dollar. votes the 
creditor has. Second, if the holder of an allowed secured claim objects to 
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, then §1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I) pro-
vides that the plan must award to the creditor "the value, as of the 
:effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan 
.. : [that] is not less than the allowed amount of such claim." The court 
must therefore value the collateral· in order to decide how much a 
Chapter 13 plan must award to the sequred creditor. 
A court cannot value property without _first choosing· a valuation 
standard. Further, when the property the secured creditor receives 
under a Chapter 13 · plan is in the form of periodic payments, which i's 
common, these "shall be in equal monthly amounts." The court cannot 
determine the size of these payments without first choosing a method by 
which to calculate the interest rate needed to discount a payment stream 
to present value. Sections 506 and 1325, until recently, had been silent 
with respect to which valuation standard the bankruptcy courts should 
use when valuing collateral and which method should guide the court's 
choice of an interest rate. The Code today continues to offer no guidance 
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on the interest rate issue. The Federal courts therefore once had to fill in 
the valuation blank and must still fill in . the interest rate blank. 
In two stunningly stupid opinions, the Supreme Court chose the 
criteria to guide bankruptcy courts in resolving valuation and interest 
rate issues. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash1 held that the bank-
ruptcy court should use a replacement cost standard to value liened 
property. Under this standard, the bankruptcy court must ask how much 
the debtor would have to pay to replace the collateral.2 More recently, 
Till v. SGS Credit Corp. 3 held that the bankruptcy court should choose 
an interest rate by beginning with the prime rate and then adjusting 
that rate to reflect the risk profile that the particular Chapter 13 debtor 
poses. This short Essay will consider the reasoning-charitably -put-of 
these cases and their effect. 
The ability to obtain a bankruptcy discharge partly insures persons 
against shocks to their income. Moral hazard and adverse selection 
concerns preclude the selling of market insurance against income shocks; 
but the discharge is a partial substitute; it permits an insolvent person 
to "collect" a suni equal to the debts the discharge c·ancels if she turns 
over her nonexempt assets to her creditors. The "premium" for this 
insurance is in the form of a higher interest rate.4 Full insurance w:ould 
permit the insured-here the individual borrower-to keep her marginal 
utility constant in every state of the world. Chapter 7 cannot achieve this 
goal because it protects only that portion of a person's income that 
equals her unpaid debts. Chapter 13 partly responds to this "coverage 
gap". When the debtor would realize more utility from retaining assets 
than she would obtain if she yielded her assets to her creditors in return 
for the income that a discharge would free up, Chapter 13 permits her to 
make a different trade: she can retain the assets at the cost of paying her 
"disposable income" to her creditors during the Chapter 13 plan.5 
The results in Rash and Till, it will be shown, reach inconsistent 
results from an insurance point of view. Rash requires Chapter 13 
debtors to pay a high price to creditors for retaining collateral: the 
collateral's replacement value. Raising the price to play in Chapter 13 
must reduce the insurance coverage. the Bankruptcy Code provides. In 
contrast, Till requires a debtor to purchase additional insurance. This 
result obtains because the prime rate is significantly lower than the rate 
that obtains in markets for consumer credit. The lower is the interest 
1.. 1fao'u.~. 953 (1997). 
2. The 2005 13ankruptcy Act codified the holding in Rash. See §506(a)(2). 
' 'i, " 
3. 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
4. See Barry Adler, Ben -Polak and Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: 
A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. Legal Studies 585 (2000). 
5. See §1325(b)(2). 
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rate, in turn, the lower is the sum of the periodic payments that the 
Chapter 13 plan will require. Since the payments are supposed to equal 
the collateral's value, when the total payment stream falls the creditor, 
in effect, has less collateral. The creditor will respond by raising the 
interest rate on the initial loan. Till thus requires an individual borrow-
. er to put less collateral at risk, but she must pay a higher inte_rest rate in 
return: that is, she must purchase additional bankruptcy insurance. The 
opinions that n;i.ade up the majority in Till did not acknowledge (recog-
nize?) that the effect of Till is to require borrowers to purchase more 
insurance while the effect of Rash was to require borrowers to purchase 
less. · 
Congress also regulates incoherently. The new Bankruptcy Code 
requires higher income debtors to use Chapter 13 but Congress codified 
the Rash result, which discourages the use of Chapter 13 by debtors who 
continue to have a choice. In addition, a legislature coherently can prefer 
Chapter 13 only if the legislature dislikes the insurance against income 
shocks that a bankruptcy law can provide; for under Chapter 13 the · 
debtor must pay much of her income to her creditors rather than have 
that income freed up by a discharge. The new Code, however, failed to 
overrule Till, which requires the bankruptcy court to use an interest 
rate standard, in Chapter 13, that requires consumers to purchase 
additional insurance. Part 2 below discusses Rash; Part 3 discusses Till; 
and Part 4 is a Conclusion that also comments briefly on how the lower 
Federal Courts should interpret the Bankruptcy Code when the Supreme 
Court will hear few bankruptcy cases and has only a limited competence 
in the·bankruptcy field. 
~ ·2. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash 
Rash involved the valuation of a truck that the Chapter 13 debtors 
used in their business and wished to retain. The two chief coritenders for 
a valuation standard were the foreclosure value and the replacement 
value. The foreclosure value ·represented the sum the creditor would 
realize if it foreclosed and then sold the collateral. Since the creditor is 
usually a financial· institution, it will sell in the wholesale market. The 
Court chose. the replacement value, which is higher because the price 
that the debtor would have to pay to purchase the collateral would 
reflect the retailer's costs.6 
The Court recognized that a secured creditor who is awarded period-
ic payments in lieu of the collateral runs the risks that the debtor cannot 
6. The Court, in note 6, added that the "creditor should n~t receive portions of the 
retail price, if any; that reflects the value of items the debtor does not receive when he 
retains his vehicle, items such as warranties . . . and reconditioning. Nor should the 
·creditor gain from modifications to the property ... to which a creditor's lien would not 
extend under state law." These clarifications will complicate some valuation hearings. 
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pay and that the collateral may depreciate or be damaged. The Court 
required the Chapter 13 debtor to pay her creditor the higher retail 
value rather than the lower wholesale value as the price of retaining 
collateral in order to compensate the creditor for these risks. An alterna-
tive response would have been to use the foreclosure standard, but then 
to adjust the interest rate used to equate the Chapter 13 payments to the 
collateral's present value to reflect the risks the particular debtor posed. 
The Court rejected this response because, it claimed, interest rates 
cannot be appropriately adjusted for risk. This claim was understandably 
made without reasons because it is incorrect. The claim also was implic-
itly rejected in Till. The four justice plurality there, as well as the four 
dissenters, all believed that the bankruptcy court could adjust an inter-
est rate to account correctly for risk; the dividing issue in Till was the 
standard by which the court should be governed when choosing that 
rate. 
After Rash, the debtor's net payoff from keeping an asset if the 
debtor uses Chapter 13 is the value the debtor- attaches to the collateral 
less the price of keeping it, which is the replacement cost. Denoting the 
value. to the debtor as v and the replacement cost as c, the dEibtor 
realizes v-c when she chooses a Chapter 13 plan.7 A debtor who uses 
Chapter 7 must turn the collateral over to the secured creditor, but she 
can bargain with the creditor to keep the collateral. If the creditor 
exercised its contract right to repossess, it would realize the_ collateral's 
foreclosure value, which is denoted f. The Chapter 7 "bargaining 
range" -the possible surplus from eschewing repossession-therefore is 
v - f: the creditor must receive at least f, the sum it could command if the 
parties do not agree, and the debtor will pay no more than v. Letting a 
index the debtor's bargaining power in a renegotiation (0 :s; a :s; 1), the 
debtor's return if the debtor renegotiates in Chapter 7 to r~tain aliened 
asset thus is her share of the surplus, or a(v - f). 
The debtor would do better under Chapter 7 than under Chapter 13; 
after Rash, if her share of the surplus from a Chapter 7 renegotiation 
would exceed her net gain in Chapter· 13 from keeping the collateral 
under a plan and paying the creditor the replacement value. Using the 
notation here, the debtor will use Chapter 7 when 
a(v -f) >v -c 
It is illuminating to rewi:ite this inequality as 
7. The value to the -::onsumer is assumed here to exceed the replacement value 






To see why, realize that had the Court chqsen the foreclosure standard 
as the valuation measure for Chapter 13, the c in the numerator of the 
fraction on the right hand side of the inequality would have been 
replaced by an f Then the right hand side would have equaled one. Since 
cr is bounded from above by one (the debtor cannot have more than all 
the bargaining power), the inequality could never have been satisfied: 
th~t is; the debtor would always have used Chapter 13 when she wanted 
to keep important collateral. 
· Regarding the intuition underlying this analysis, had the Court used 
the foreclosure standard, the Chapter 13 debtor would have been able to 
keep all of the surplus generated by permitting her to retain the_ 
collateral: the entire difference between the value of the asset to her and 
its value. to the creditor. Under Rash, since c, the replacement value, 
exceeds the value of the collateral to the creditor (c > f) the Chapter 13 
debtor can keep only a fraction of this surplus: the creditor necessarily 
gets the rest. To be sure, the Chapter 7 debtor also can retain only a 
fraction of the surplus; this fraction is represented by the bargaining 
power parameter a. However, since all is greater than a part of all, Rash 
makes Chapter 13 relatively less attractive to debtors; 
After Rash, debtors will choose Chapter 7 when their bargaining 
power will permit them to command more of the surplus from avoiding 
repossession than they could realize under the court set Chapter 13 
price. 8 The greater the difference between the replacement value and 
foreclosure value, the more likely· it is that consumer will gravitate' 
towards Chapter 7. Rash therefore reduced the ability of Chapter 13 to 
make up for Chapter 7's failings as a wage'insurance vehicle.9 
8. The debtor is more likely to renegotiate in Chapter _7 to retaip collateral when she 
has a lot of ·bargaining power (a is large) or when the replacement value substantially 
exceeds the foreclosure value. 
9. The text does not claim that, after Rash, every debtor would be less likely to use 
Chapter 13. A debtor's choice of Chapter is a function of several factors, such as her 
preference to retain collateral and the uses to which she could put her income if she 
obtained a Chapter 7 discharge. This essay rather identifies a marginal effect: Rash 
reduces the attractiveness of Chapter 13 as a mechanism for retaining collateral and thus 
r_educes the ability of the Bankruptcy Code to provide (partial) wage insurance to debtors 
for whom retaining particular collateral is important. · 
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3. Till v. SCS Credit Corp. 
The Tills had purchased a used truck. They gave a purchase money 
security interest to the seller, who assigned it to SCS Credit Corp. The 
parties agreed, in the Chapter 13 proceeding, that the truck should be 
valued at $4,000 and that the Tills would be required to make periodic 
payments to SCS in order to retain the truck. The issue was how to 
choose tp.e interest rate required to discount these payments to present 
value. 
The two chief contenders for an interest rate standard were the 
prime rate and the subprime rate. When the bankruptcy court approved 
the Chapter 13 plan in Till, the prime rate was 8% and t];ie subprime 
rate was 21 %.10 _Creditors charge the prime rate when lending to sound 
_business borrowers. The prime rate thus is the lowest rate that borrow-
ers who pose a risk of default pay. Creditors charge the subprime rate to 
borrowers, such as individual persons and small firms, who pose a more 
substantial risk of incurring payment difficulties. Both of these rates 
represent baselines. A bankruptcy court using the prime rate, for exam-
.ple, might .adjust that rate upwards to reflect the payment risk that the 
particular Chapter 13 debtor posed. 
The bankruptcy court chose the prime rate as a baseline, but 
adjusted this rate upwards to reflect its view of the payment risk that 
the Tills themselves posed. AB a result, the Tills' Chapter 13 plan 
equated the payments the Tills had to make to the collatei:al's $4,000 
value using a discount rate of 9.5%. SCS had argued that the subprime 
rate should be the baseline because it best reflected the value of the 
truck to them. as of the plan date. If SCS were allowed to repossess, it 
argued, then SCS would have sold the truck for $4,000 and then used the 
proceeds to finance another transaction in the subpri;rne market with a 
debtor no less risky than the Tills. The truck thus was worth $4,000 lent 
at 21 % to the creditor. The District and Circuit courts both accepted this 
argument and reversed the bankruptcy court. The Supreme Court, 
however, reinstated the bankruptcy court's order. Four justices agreed 
with the circuit and district courts below; four justices agreed with the 
bankruptcy court that the prime rate was the appropriate starting point 
for a consumer or small business debtor; and Justice Thomas was the 
swing vote that made up a majority for the prime rate. 
This essay begins with Justice Thomas's opinion. Two elements 
constitute an interest rate; -the rate must compensate the lender for the 
time value of money, and the rate must compensate the lender -for 
bearil]-g tlie risk: of nonpa,yment. The former element is-best approxim;it-
ed by the risk free qi.t!:l. Justice Thomas read the Bankruptcy Code to 
10. · Apparently, the subpdlile iate also had been 21% when the Tills bou~ht the 
truck. 
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hold that when the payments under a Chapter 13 plan.are intended;to 
equal the present value of tangible prop1:1rty {in .this casEl; atryck), tJ/.e 
Code requires the plan interest rate to refl.ect only the time value .of 
money; but when the payments instead are intended to equal the present 
value of a promise to pay money (for example; Jl promissory n~te), t~e 
plan interest rate must also -reflect the payment risk. The risk free rate 
was closer to the 9.5% rate that the four justice plurality11 preferred than 
to the 21 % rate the dissenters preferred, so Justice Thomas concurred in 
reinstating the bankruptcy court's opinion. 
Justice Thomas recognized that awarding a lender with a security 
interest in tangible property only the risk free rate would under compen-
sate the lender. Justice Thomas also seemed to believe',that the risk that 
a debtor cannot make her Chapter 13 payments · ordin11rily is indepen-
dent of the nature of the collateral-a truck or a note_;__that the plan 
payments are meant to equal. On this plausible view of the commercial 
situation, it would have been irrational of Congress· to permit creditors 
who lend on the basis of paper to be fully compensated but not to permit 
creditors who lend on the basis of things to be fully compensated. 
According to Justice Thomas, however, the .plain meaning of the ·code 
directed this crazy result, and it is not the Court's job to rescue CongTess 
from its mistakes. The plain meaning that Justic~ Thomas attributed to 
§1325 eluded every other judge who considered the i,ssue so it is worth 
turning to the plurality opinion. · ' 
Three related reasons seem most to have influenced the plurality's 
choice of the prime rate. First, the plurality believed that the subprime 
market likely was uncompetitive.12 Second, and in consequence of first, 
the administrative costs of using the subprime rate would be high 
relative to the · costs of using the prime rate. Creditors would earn 
monopoly rents in an uncompetitive subprime market. Since Chapter 13 
should not compensate for these rents, the bankruptcy court would have 
to see whether they existed in any case, and if so to filter them out when 
setting the interest rate. This would require a lot of hearings. In 
contrast, the plurality believed that the prime market was competitive s9 
there would be fewer hearings if interest rates in that market were the 
baseline. Third, the information that a court would have to use in 
Chapter 13 rate hearings, were the subprime rate the baseline, was 
largely in the creditor's possession. The creditor was more likely to 
possess information relevant to its competitiveness and to its profits. 
Therefore, the creditor would have an undue advantage in the rate 
hearing. 
11. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and 
Souter. 
12. The bankruptcy court did not hold a hearing on the competitiveness ~f the 
subprime lending market, so this claim seemed more assertion than established fact. 
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The premise that subprime credit markets are uncompetitive is 
dubious, and there was evidence to the contrary. The creditor in Till lent 
at the then going market rate. Putting chance to one side, a correspon-
dence between contract and market rates would occur when all lenders 
charged roughly the same rate. There are only two prices on which every 
creditor will coordinate. When a fair number of borrowers comparison 
shop, competition will cause firms to charge the competitive price. When 
few consumers comparison shop, every firm will charge the monopoly 
price. If there is a "moderate" amount of comparison shopping, there 
will be- price dispersion. Since there was a 21 % rate in the market in 
which the Tills borrowed, that market either was in a competitive or a 
monopoly equilibrium. That subprime lending markets are routinely 
characterized by monopoly pricing is unlikely. There are many firms in: 
every geographical market; entry co1?ts are low; price advertising is 
common; and the requirement that firms quote interest rates in a 
common format (the annual percentage rate) makes consumer search 
costs relatively low.-That some local subprime markets are uncompeti-
tive is possible; that creditors in the entire subprime market earn 
· monopoly rents is far fetched. 
The plurality's opinion collapses if its views :regarding monopQly are 
rejected. Initially, if the subprime market is assumed to be competitive, 
the bankruptcy courts would not need to convert _Chapter 13 hearings 
into antitrust cases except in unusual circumstances. In fact, there 
wouid ·be many fewer hearings had the Court chosen the subprime rate 
than there will be now. A bankruptcy court that began with the plausible 
premfae that subprime credit :i±iarR:ets are competitive could- use the 
contract rate as a presumptively accurate proxy for the market rate. This 
presumption should be overcome-there should be an individual rate 
hearing-only if (a) the market interest rate had changed in the interim 
between the extension of credit and the time the Chapter 13 plan had to 
be approved; or (b) the debtor at bar appeared to pose a non-trivially 
different risk than the typical Chapter 13 debtor. In contrast, because 
the prime rate reflects the risk that a sound business borrower poses, 
and such borrowers are much less risky than typical individual borrow-
ers, the prime rate will have to be adjusted in every case in which 
valuation is an issue and the -debtor is a natural person. Thus,- there 
would have been many fewer hearings had the Cuµrt permitted the 
bankruptcy courts to use contract interest rates as presumptively accu-
rate Chapter 13 rates. 
Turning from the opinions to the result, using the prime rate as the 
baseline is problematic · because it requires consumers to buy more 
_insurance than manyofthem would want. To see why, consider a simple 
illustration of the Chapter 13 valuation task. A plan, suppose, lasts for 
one year and requires the debtor to make one payment to the secured 
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lender at year's end.13 Beginning with the prime rate and adjusting 
upwards would yield a discount factor of 
<5 
1 
C l +r 
C 
where 
The subscript c indicates that the rate is set by the court and rP is the 
prime rate. This rate, in turn, would have to raised by the factor 'Y to 
reflect the individual debtor's payment risk. 
Denote by v the value of the collateral and by x0 the required 
payment under a plan that uses· the discount factor 60 , Then the 
bankruptcy court w,9uld equate the collateral's value to the plan's 
required payment·with the equation 
v =8x 
C C 
It is illuminating to solve for the payment that the plan would require 






In the Till case, the prime rate was 8% and 'Y-the bankruptcy court's 
_adjustment factor-was 1.5%. Using these values in our example, the 
13. For readers unfamiliar with finance notation, assume that a person has a sum v 
topay and will put it in a bank at an annual interest rate of r for one year. At year's end, 
the person will have the "future vitlue (FV)" of the sum, which will be.(1 + r)v. Since vis 
what the person has today it is the "present value". Then FV = (1 + r)v, and solving for 
the present value yields v = FV/(1 + r). It is customary to let 1/(1 + r) = ll, where ll is the 
"discount factor". Since the interest rate is positive, ll is less than one. Thus, if someone. 
promises to pay a person the sum FV = $100 in one year, the present value of this sum is ll 
x $100. As the interest rate r increases, the discount factor ll falls, reflecting the fact that 
the value of a future payment falls as the interest rate rises. 
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interest rate would be 9.5% so the discount factor would be 50 === .91324. 
The collateral was valued at $4,000. Therefore, the future sum that 
would be equivalent to receiving $4,000 as of the date of the plan would 
be x
0 
= $4,380. The interest rate method that the Court <;:hose would 
generate this payment under a Chapter 13 plan. 
Suppose instead that the bankruptcy court began by using the 
contract rate as the proxy for the subprime market· rate, and that no 
adjustments to this rate would have been w~ranted in the illustrative 
case. Denote the applicable discount factor as 5m, where m refers to the 
market. The subprime market rate in Till was 21 %, and this would "_\:lave 
yielded a discount factor of .82645. As a result, the plan would have 
required the debtor to pay the suin Xm === $4,840. The creditor thus 
receives $460 less when the bankruptcy court in this example adjusts 
upward from the prime rate rather than begins with the contract rate. 
To understand the effect that using the prime rate has on the 
parties at the lending stage, realize that while the bankruptcy court may 
begin with the prime rate, the creditor, when lending the money, will ask 
what the collateral would be worth to it should the debtor default. -To 
answer this question, the creditor will discount the payment it expects to 
get under the plan using its own discount factor. Therefore, the secured 
creditor's expected Chapter 13 payoff when the debtor retains collateral 
_ will b,e 






the creditor who makes a secured loan will expect to receive, in the 
default state, not the collateral's market value of v, but rather the lesser 
sum !3v'. In our exaJI1ple, !3-the ratio of the subprime market discount 
factor to tlie Court's prime market disco_unt factor-is approximately .9.
14 
Hence, if the creditor · expected the bankruptcy court to adjust upward 
14. .82645/.91324 g;1 .9. 
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from the prime rate, the creditor would have valued the collateral at 90% 
of its real market value. 
Perhaps a more vivid way to put this result is to realize that the 
creditor in the example does not expect to receive a payment of $4,840 
that equates to a present value of $4,000 at an interest rate of 21 %. 
Rather, the creditor expects to receive a payment of $4,380. When the 
creditor discounts this payment at the market interest rate of 21 % (i.e., 
when the creditor uses elm = .82645), this payment equates to a present . 
value of $3,619.85. The creditor thus will act, when lending the money,· · 
as if it is receiving a security interest, not in property worth $4,000, but 
in property worth $3,619.85. 
An objection to this analysis _is that beginning with the prime rate 
and appropriately adjusting up for risk would yield the same discount 
factor as beginning with the subprime rate and appropriately adjusting 
down. If a debtor actually posed a true 21 % payment risk, the bankrupt-
cy court would add 13% 'to the 8% prime rate. Justice Scalia argued in 
dissent that bankruptcy courts will be unlikely to find that the debtors 
before them are more than 200% riskier than the required baseline. The 
bankruptcy court's performance in Till (choosing the discount factor by 
raising the prime rate less than 19%) is evidence for this plausible view. 
The phenomenon of anchoring and adjustment also likely would play a 
role. The bankruptcy court is a natural person, and there is much 
evidence that persons "_anchor on"-they do not stray far from-exoge-
nously imposed starting points for analysis. The prime rate is such a 
starting point. The anchoring phenomenon thus predicts that when 
courts must begin with this rate, they will choose nontrivially higher 
discount factors than courts would have chosen had they been permitted 
_ to begin with the subprime rate.15 
Requiring bankruptcy courts to begin with the prime rate when 
choosing payment streams reduces the value of collateral and therefore 
raises the effective interest rate that persons must pay to borrow.16 This 
is because when the sum the creditor can realize on default falls, the 
_creditor_ must increase the sum that the borrower must pay if she · 
15. The analysis above showed that creditors will calculate the value of collateral to 
them by multiplying the collateral's market value by the factor 13, where 13 is the ratio of 
the discount factor the creditor uses to the discount factor it expects the court to use. The 
argument in text is that this ratio will always be less than one when bankruptcy courts 
must begin with the prime rate because these courts will then use above market discount 
factors. Therefore, Till always restricts the amount of collateral that debtors can offer. 
16. A prime rate standard is Jess objectionable for business borrowers because this 
rate more closely approximates a corporate debtor's risk profile. For the reasons given 
above, however, it would be better for the court to begin with the rate that obtained in the 
market in which the debtor borrowed, whatever that rate was. 
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remains solvent.17 Till therefore requires borrowers to purchase addi-
tional insurance against default. The borrower no longer is able to put 
the full market value of her property at risk when borrowing. Rather, 
she can put only a fraction (in the analysis here, 13) of that property at 
risk. The borrower must purchase this added protection against income 
shocks with the interest rate increase that a collateral restriction cre-
ates. A more concise Way to state this effect is th~t, the Supreme Court 
amended the Bankruptcy Code to reduce the ability of borrowers to 
secure loans.18 
4. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court, in Rash, held that a borrower who wishes to 
retain liened assets in Chapter 13 must pay the creditor the assets' 
replacement value. The Court later held, in Till, that whe:ri dis~ounting 
this sum to present value, the bankruptcy court should begin with the 
prlme rate and adjust that rate upwards to reflect the risk the particular 
debtor poses. The effect of Rash is to reduce the insurance against 
income shocks that the Code providEJs because requiring debtors to pay 
the maximum .price for retaining collateral in Chapter 13 encourages 
debtors to use Chapter 7 if it is· available to them. The debtor's ex post 
utility thus is lower than it would have been if the Chapter 13 price for 
keeping assets reflected only the value of those assets to the creditor.- In 
17. To be precise, letting the risk free rate be zero for convenience, if dis the sum 
the consumer borrows, p is the repayment probability and F is the consequent sum the 





For a derivation of this equation, see Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business 
Bankruptcy, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1207-1211 (2005). Recalling that 
8 /3=~. 
~ 
the greater is the difference between the discount factor that the creditor uses (15m) and the 
.discount factor that the court is expected to use (15c) the smaller is j3 and the larger is F. 
The effective interest rate is F/d-1, so discounting Chapter 13 plan payments by beginning 
with 'the ,prime rate raises interest rates. 
18. Four justices dissented in Till, there was a plurality of four in the majority and 
Justice 'I'homas's_ opinion' did not join the plurality on any issue. Consequently, there was a 
majo:r1tyfor,the ,result; but not a majority for the plurality's view. The case thus has little 
,practical ;alue: ' 
ALAN SCHWARTZ 115.·. 
contrast, the likely effect of Till is to require the borrower to purchase 
more insurance against a shock to her-income because beginning with 
the prime rate reduces the amount of collateral the borrower can put at 
risk. The holdings in these cases remain inconsistent if other policies are 
attributed to the Code. Thus, Rash increases the borrower's incentive to 
exert effort to remain solvent because the case makes bankruptcy 
relatively less attractive. Till reduces the borrower's incentive to exert 
effort because it makes bankruptcy relatively more attractive.18 
Perhaps the best explanation of these cases is that the Court did not 
understand the consequences of its holdings or could not keep the entire 
consumer bankruptcy field in its (collective) mind. For example, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Rash and joined the plurality in 
Till. This is a hard double to make for a person with a three digit IQ 
who knew what she was doing. 
Congress codified the Rash result and let the Till result stand. It is 
more difficult to attribute a lack of expertise to the Congress than to the 
·court, but it is perhaps easier to attribute a lack of focus. The new Code 
contains more provisions pertaining to specific industries and particular 
problems (e.g., leasing, credit card debt) than the prior law, and lobbying 
was intense. Perhaps Congress paid too much attention to bankruptcy 
trees and too little to the forest. 
Congress's inattention increases the .importance of the Federal 
courts' role in interpreting a bankruptcy law that is composed largely of 
standa:rds, and in harmonizing differing statutory constructions. The two 
cases analyzed here, as well as the very limited number of cases of every 
type that the Supreme Court hears, suggest that the interpretive and 
harmonizing functions are better performed by the lower Federal 
courts.1~ This conclusion gives rise to a thought that is only expressed 
here but should be developed further elsewhere. If a unitary and compe-
tent high court had ultimilte charge of the bankruptcy law, then each 
Federal circuit should develop those interpretations of the law that seem 
best to it. The highest court would·then have the advantage of observing 
the likely full set of thoughtful positions when specifying what the 
18. Without data it is difficult to know whether the insurance and incentive effects of 
these decisions fully offset. Both cases, however, needlessly increase the administrative 
costs of consumer bankruptcy: Rash by encouraging litigation over how to calculate 
replacement values and Till by increasing the number of interest rate hearings. The cases 
thus may reflect a retreat from the courts bankruptcy decisions of the 80s and much of the 
90s. These decisions sought to reduce the discretion of the bankruptcy courts. See Alan 
Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court's 
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 49 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 149 (2001). 
19. This view is consistent with Rasmussen's claim that bankruptcy policy is better 
made by these courts. See Robert Rasmussen, ''.A Study of the Costs and Benefits of 
Textuali~m: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases", 77 Wash. U.L.Q. 535 (1993). 
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bankruptcy law says. The Supreme Court's limited jurisdiction implies 
that the Court cari have only a partial charge of the bankruptcy law, and 
the decisions here, and others, indicate that the Court is not especially 
competent in the bankruptcy area.20 These considerations suggest that 
· the circuits should view themselves as if they were state supreme courts 
when interpreting the Code. When the state courts function in fields 
with a national scope, such as contracts, they are influenced both by 
what they think is best and by what other courts have done. There is an 
:informal but real pressure to choose decisions that harmonize with the 
law elsewhere so that the common law can be uniform among the states. 
A typical state court thus requires a more serious policy conviction to 
choose a rule that goes against the grain than it requires to choose a rule 
initially. Because there is little effective high court review in the bank-
ruptcy field, the circuits perhaps should be as influenced by what other 
circuits have done when interpreting the Code as the high state-courts 
are by what other state courts have done when creating the common 
law. This suggestion deserves more thought than is given to it here, but 
is made because we now have the alternative, and· it is undesirable. 
20. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 18; Rasmussen, Id. 
